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Civil Defence in the Second World War: The Air Raid Precautions Organization (ARP)
I Introduction
Civil defence, or passive defence as it was called before the Second World War, “…may be defined as comprising those measures of protection which can be taken on the ground to minimize the effect of attacks from the air, both of personnel and material.” Some of the measures, such as setting up warning systems, can be prepared in advance. Others, such as population evacuation, can be instituted only upon warning or expectation of attack. In all cases, the extent of planning, training, and implementation which occurs prior to the attack increases the effectiveness of the measures.
The origins of civil defence in Canada can be traced back to the creation of the Air Raid Precautions organization (ARP) by the federal government in the Department of Pensions and National Health before the Second World War. Since passive defence was an aspect of national defence, it was regarded as a federal responsibility. The protective measures required to implement it, however, were local by their very nature. While this dichotomy was recognized in theory, until the jurisdictional, financial, and practical responsibilities were precisely defined, there was constant federal-provincial tension. Political fears of national disunity associated with questions of war shrouded pre-war planning in secrecy and prevented consultation with the provincial governments. Consequently, the first two years of the war were marked by frantic activity at the local and provincial levels and ad hoc solutions to problems at the federal level. Not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did the three levels of governments work out acceptable policies to establish an efficient civil defence organization in Canada.
II Pre-War Preparations
As the international situation in the Far East and in Europe worsened in the mid-1930s, the newly elected Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King began slowly and deliberately to prepare for a possible war. In August 1936, the government established the Canadian Defence Committee as a committee of cabinet: its mission was to plan for the defence of Canada. At its first meeting the committee discussed the danger of air attack and the provision of adequate protection for the civilian population. On the recommendation of the Department of National Defence, the Prime Minister approved the creation of six interdepartmental committees in April 1937. One of them was the Interdepartmental Air Raid Precautions (ARP) Committee whose purpose was to examine the problem of air raid precautions (hence its name) and to recommend actions to be taken by federal authorities to protect the civilian population. Almost a year later, in March 1938, an order-in-council formally established these committees, stipulating that they were to report to the Minister of National Defence rather than to the Defence Committee.
Because measures to protect the public from the effects of air raids (especially gas attacks) were likely to be medical or health related, the Interdepartmental ARP Committee was placed under the authority of the Department of Pensions and National Health with the Deputy-Minister of that department, Dr. R. E. L. Wodehouse, as chairperson. This committee, which represented eight federal departments, began its deliberations on 29 March 1938. It was instructed “To enquire into and report upon non-military measures which should be adopted against the possibility of air attacks, including gas attacks, and the co-ordination of the action of the various authorities concerned, both public and private.” It studied British precedents, including the 1934 Handbook of Passive Air Defence. The Department of National Defence provided estimates of the forms and scale of air attack on east and west coast cities in the event of an European or Asian war as a basis for planning. Any consultation with provincial or municipal authorities was precluded, however, by the government’s insistence on secrecy lest it be thought that Canada was preparing for war.
The first (and last) report of the Interdepartmental ARP Committee was submitted on 30 June and approved by Cabinet in late July 1938. In this report, the committee raised jurisdictional and financial questions which would continue to bedevil the ARP organization throughout the Second World War. As an aspect of national defence, the committee argued, passive defence was the primary responsibility of the federal government which should prepare a handbook outlining the shape of the organization to be created and the nature of the passive defence measures required. Of necessity, implementation of these detailed schemes would devolve upon the municipalities. At this local level, the necessary administrative machinery already existed and could be augmented by volunteer workers. The federal government would bear the cost of services beyond those which a municipality had in place, such as producing the handbook, of procuring gas masks for the civilian population, of buying decontamination materials, and of training instructors. The link between the federal and municipal governments would, it was hoped, be provided by the provincial government, an arrangement which confirmed the existing political situation. The Interdepartmental ARP Committee also recommended that the Department of Pensions and National Health, which already dealt with several provinces and through them the municipal bodies on matters pertaining to the physical well-being of the population, assume responsibility for ARP. After Cabinet approval of this report, the committee effectively ceased to function.
As a follow-up, Wodehouse set up a committee of six officials from the Department of Pensions and National Health to continue to develop federal aspects of the program. He enlarged this group of officials by adding two representatives from the Department of National Defence, the Director of the St. John Ambulance Association, and the Dominion Fire Commissioner. Wodehouse also provided the committee with ambitious terms of reference, too ambitious as it turned out for the government. Its mission was to consider all points arising in connection with air raid precautions schemes, to act, when necessary, as the medium of consultation with outside authorities and also to provide generally for co-ordination, not only between government departments but with such other authorities as may be concerned. It is responsible for submitting to the interdepartmental committee matters on policy on which decisions are required, together with recommendations as to the course of action suggested.
The major accomplishment of the Departmental ARP Committee was to produce Air Raid Precautions, General Information for the Civil Authorities, a Canadian version of the British Handbook of Passive Air Defence issued in 1934. Amended and adapted to the Canadian situation, this handbook was intended to provide instructions to Canadian provincial and municipal authorities when the time came to set up local ARP organizations. Although 500 copies were printed in October 1938, they were not issued until August 1939. (In addition, 700 sets of handbooks and memoranda about particular aspects of ARP were purchased from the British government.) As well, the committee prepared requisition and other forms and instructional material for local use. It also collected data on the population and resources of vulnerable areas, on the availability of fire fighting equipment in them, on the dangers of infection of crops and farm animals, and on other matters it considered relevant. It suggested an alternative plan of action if the provincial governments refused to assume their designated roles and recommended the creation and organization of an ARP headquarters in Ottawa.
Having compiled the handbook and collected a great deal of information, the Departmental ARP Committee submitted a report to the Minister of Pensions and National Health on 5 December 1938. The committee now wanted to move ahead with more concrete proposals and to involve the provincial authorities. It recommended that plans should be made for the evacuation of non-essential civilians from areas that were either under attack or likely to be attacked. It saw the need to set up first-aid stations, build up Canadian stocks of narcotics, and provide additional hospital accommodation and equipment in vulnerable areas and receiving areas. It suggested that warning systems be installed in vulnerable areas and that air raid shelters be built. To deal with the destruction of an aerial attack, it recommended the provision of additional fire-fighting equipment, the training of auxiliary firemen, and the procuring of wrecking equipment in vulnerable centres. Wodehouse recommended to his minister that a budget be prepared for cabinet approval to carry out the committee’s plans. The necessity to defend spending such large sums on ARP in the House of Commons created a difficulty. This, together with the publicity that would undoubtedly accompany a suggestion that the provincial authorities be consulted undoubtedly convinced the government to halt all progress in ARP measures. The Department of Pensions and National Health was forced to mark time until the Polish crisis in August 1939.
While the federal government had clearly recognized the need for passive defence planning in the pre-war period, it was only prepared to act within a restricted sphere. Financial restraint and the danger of national disunity limited activity to the provision of a secret rudimentary plan of action and a skeleton federal organization. Because the government insisted on secrecy in preparing the ARP scheme, there was no chance to consult with provincial and municipal authorities, especially on the sharing of responsibilities and financing. Such consultation could have obviated the subsequent wrangling over finances early in the war. As well, a clear-cut announcement of government policy on ARP measures might have restrained the hysteria following the fall of France in 1940 as local authorities and agencies scrambled to put passive defence measures in place. Ultimately, the officials of the Department of Pensions and National Health could do little more than copy British measures. Secrecy prevented these schemes from being tested against Canadian conditions.
III The Development of ARP, August 1939 – December 1941
As Hitler prepared to invade Poland in August 1939 and pushed Europe to the brink of war, the federal government acted swiftly to set up a civil defence system before war was declared. In accordance with a pre-arranged plan, members of the Departmental Committee in the Department of Pensions and National Health were sent to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and British Columbia on 25 August and to Quebec a week later. The Government of Ontario, however, refused to participate. As federal officials met with representatives of the provincial governments and explained the principles of passive defence, they suggested that steps be taken to meet emergencies and offered federal co-operation. The legal basis for implementing ARP measures was established by Sections 32-36 inclusive of the Defence of Canada Regulations (DCR) promulgated on 3 September 1939. Under these regulations, the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Pensions and National Health, or his delegate (usually the provincial premier), had sweeping powers to order evacuations, to put precautionary measures in place against attack, to close or destroy damaged or contaminated buildings, to limit lights and sounds, and to institute curfews.
To carry out federal ARP responsibilities, an officer of the Department of Pensions and National Health was appointed to assume control as Executive of Air Raid Precautions for Canada on 1 September. The Departmental Committee would advise him on policy matters. His duties were never specifically defined, but many evolved over the next two years. He advised provincial and municipal ARP committees, made provincial tours of inspection, maintained liaison with the Home Office in the United Kingdom and later with the Office of Civil Defence in the United States, and supervised the manufacture and distribution of ARP equipment. He also prepared and distributed ARP publications, made public addresses, and advised the Minister and Deputy Minister on policy questions.
Federal civil defence intentions were outlined in the handbook, Air Raid Precautions, General Information for the Civil Authorities, which the Departmental Committee had prepared in 1938. This document provided the basis for provincial and local organization and described ARP services. Usually, an ARP Committee of the provincial government was set up to deal with general policy and to advise those municipalities declared by the Department of National Defence to be vulnerable to attack. Municipal or local committees, made up of volunteers, were established to be responsible for the detailed organization of ARP measures. Auxiliary firemen and auxiliary public utility workers were designated to maintain vital services during an emergency. First-aid workers’ duties included staffing first-aid posts, acting as stretcher bearers, driving ambulances, and generally taking care of casualties after an attack. Air raid wardens were to act as auxiliary police, with authority for maintaining order during a blackout practice or an actual air raid and responsibility for transmitting necessary information to the public. Except for Ontario, the designated provincial governments responded quickly and enthusiastically to these federal overtures. Each put its own individual stamp on provincial ARP organization.
Nova Scotia established an ARP committee on 29 August 1939, and local units were set up in Halifax and Sydney shortly thereafter. For all intents and purposes the provincial and Halifax committees operated as one, concerning themselves solely with Halifax. Cape Breton acted on its own and the ARP organization in Sydney extended to embrace local committees throughout the island. In Halifax, the main concerns were practicing blackouts and setting up first-aid posts. While the federal government undertook to provide first-aid, anti-gas, and decontamination equipment, it arrived very slowly. Halifax provided its own electronically operated air raid warning sirens.
Since Saint John was the only vulnerable area in New Brunswick, federal and provincial authorities agreed that the local ARP committee would also be the provincial committee. It began by establishing first-aid posts and holding blackout practices, although it also prepared an elaborate evacuation scheme to remove non-essential people to the interior of the province. While Moncton had not been declared a vulnerable area, it lobbied to have an ARP organization. When the Department of National Defence declared that there was danger of sabotage, that city too received some federal funding. By July 1940, excitement was so high that the provincial government decided to set up a province-wide skeleton ARP organization without federal aid. By this time, ARP organizations in Saint John and Moncton were well underway. Both established complete warden and first-aid organizations. Both had air raid warning systems: Saint John provided its own, while Moncton secured federal aid to install its system.
In late August 1939, British Columbia established a provincial ARP committee and by 7 September, local committees for the Victoria and Vancouver areas were set up. In each case, sub-committees were appointed to handle specific responsibilities. Initially, British Columbia’s ARP organization was most concerned to detect and deal with damage resulting from sabotage. No air raid warning systems were installed or blackout exercises held until 1941. ARP measures were, however, put in place in Prince Rupert at the end of 1939. On its own initiative, the province also organized Nanaimo. Bickering among the participating municipalities resulted in the disbanding of the Vancouver area committee in May 1941 and of the Victoria area committee at the end of the year. They were replaced by separate committees in each of the area municipalities.
In Quebec, the organization of ARP committees was delayed during a provincial election campaign resulting in the defeat of the Duplessis government. By December 1939, a provincial committee was established along with local units in Montréal and Québec City. The southern and eastern parts of the province were organized without federal funding. By December 1940, the whole of the St. Lawrence Valley from Gaspé to the Eastern Townships was covered by
a net of organizations that included an air raid warden service, an auxiliary fire service, first-aid posts with first-aid workers, and auxiliary municipal workers. There was also an armed Mobile Force organized to combat subversive activities. Despite all this activity, neither Montréal nor Québec City had held blackout exercises.
By August 1940, public opinion forced the Ontario government to reconsider its original refusal to participate in the ARP program. On 12 September, a provincial ARP committee was established by order-in-council. By March 1941, it had organized 43 ARP units in the 14 vulnerable areas. In May, the first blackout exercise was held in Toronto. A Volunteer Corps previously organized to guard certain installations against sabotage was drawn into the organization to perform warden duties and other services. The Committee also prepared manuals on the warden service, engineering services, and fire service, the last of which was adopted by federal authorities for use throughout Canada.
Because of the large number of government agencies and employees in Ottawa and Hull, the federal ARP office decided to organize a separate committee for the Federal District. Established in October 1940, it reported directly to the Minister of Pensions and National Health. By April 1941, it had set up some 30 first-aid posts and enrolled about 2,000 wardens. The Federal District organization held its first complete blackout on 26 October 1941.
As the war continued, initial provincial enthusiasm for ARP proposals was inevitably replaced by questions of federal-provincial jurisdiction. Although federal authorities claimed they had primary responsibility for ARP as an aspect of national defence, they envisioned its implementation at the local level by volunteers using existing organizations and services. Unfortunately there was no clear-cut definition of federal financial responsibility or of the amount of equipment that was needed. Ad hoc federal reactions to provincial requests increased both confusion and frustration. With no clear definition of financial authority, no precedents or firm figures for planning, relationships soon deteriorated.
As the provinces became increasingly involved in civil defence activities, it was soon evident they took a wider view of federal responsibilities. Before long they began making demands for money to pay the salaries of provincial officials, for office space, and administrative costs. These demands were met by a grant of $5,000 for each of the four provinces in January 1940 accompanied by a warning to expect no more. Nova Scotia and British Columbia managed within the limit of these funds, but New Brunswick soon spent her grant and returned for more. Quebec submitted accounts for costs of non-designated items, which the federal government initially rejected but later settled in favour of Quebec after a second grant was made to the province.
Immersed in financial wrangling, the federal government inconsistently stated that provision and maintenance of ARP warning systems and firefighting equipment were local responsibilities. Both Moncton and Saint John worked out compromises for sharing the cost of their warning systems, and by the end of 1941, the federal government had funded the installation of sirens in Victoria, Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Toronto, Ottawa, Hull, Montréal, and Québec City. Also, in July 1941, the federal program ordered 200 portable pumps and over a million feet of fire hose, which were placed at the disposal of the provincial ARP committees.
Given the preliminary state of pre-war planning, unanticipated responsibilities were bound to arise. One was provision of compensation for ARP volunteers injured or killed on duty. The provincial governments flatly refused to accept it. After initially evading the issue, the federal government agreed in September 1941 to provide pensions for ARP workers injured during training or by enemy action and for dependents if the workers were killed.
In addition, there was a legal question of whether the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Pensions and National Health had sufficient discretionary power to enforce compliance with ARP orders issued under the Defence of Canada Regulations. Federal officials initially preferred to secure co-operation by persuasion and good will. When, in May 1941, a Superior Court judge in Quebec dismissed a charge of failing to comply with blackout regulations on the grounds that the federal power had not been properly delegated to provincial officials, the federal government took action to clarify its position. The Regulations were amended, transferring authority solely to the Minister of Pensions and National Health and simplifying the issuing of orders and regulations, including the power of delegation. Further amendments gave the Minister sweeping discretionary powers to restrict public assemblies and outdoor lighting in areas considered vulnerable to hostile attack. The federal and provincial authorities now had strong legal authority for any ARP measures that might be considered necessary.
At the end of 1941, provision for Canada’s civil defence was well underway. ARP groups existed in about 150 communities and almost 95,000 volunteers were registered as ARP workers. First-aid training was well advanced, special courses had begun for auxiliary firemen, and, with the limited equipment available, some anti-gas training was occurring. The federal government had spent $350,000 on equipment (most of it for first-aid), $40,000 on incidental expenses for the provinces, and $10,000 on training through the St. John Ambulance Association. Orders had been placed for fire equipment and sirens, and a nation-wide issue of gas masks was under consideration. Although local ARP organizations varied greatly in character and achievement, each one addressed needs it considered important in its area. The St. John Ambulance Association was noteworthy for the thorough instruction of first-aid workers provided by its volunteers. In truth, most other volunteers probably did not thoroughly understand their jobs. They suffered from a lack of proper equipment, inability to train under realistic conditions, and a dearth of properly qualified and experienced instructors. It is fortunate that Canada did not receive even a small-scale air attack between 1939 and 1941 when ARP was insufficiently organized and equipped. Even after 1941, there still remained conflicts between the federal and provincial governments over financing. Training, while going on, was largely incomplete. Supplies of equipment were inadequate. Although a beginning had been made during this early period, much remained to be done.
IV The Maturing of ARP, 1942 – 1946
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 gave new emphasis to the importance of ARP, especially in British Columbia. Even before that disaster, the Chiefs of Staff had extended their definition of the area exposed to definite risk of air attack to include all of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island,all t he lower St. Lawrence Valley, the coastline of British Columbia, and Vancouver Island. Western Quebec north to James Bay, much of north-eastern Ontario, southern Ontario, and British Columbia west of the Cascade Mountains were deemed areas of slight risk. In December 1941, all of these areas were included in the compensation order covering the injury or death of volunteers. In addition, the responsibilities of both federal and provincial ARP agencies were increased to emphasize the growing importance of passive defence. Effective 1 January 1942, R. J. Manion (the former leader of the federal Conservative Party) was appointed Director of Civil Air Raid Precautions with deputy minister status, responsible only to the Minister of Pensions and National Health. Until his death in July 1943, Manion approached his duties with enthusiasm and energy. According to his successor, Brigadier General Alexander Ross, much of the success of the ARP organization until the end of the war, especially in the securing of adequate supplies of equipment, was due to his efforts.
Manion moved to eradicate the serious flaws in ARP organization which the first two years of the war had revealed. In particular, the federal-provincial financial policy was inconsistent. After a false start in February 1942, the ARP office developed a satisfactory system of assessing provincial claims to federal grants in June 1942. It was based on the degree of risk each province faced, the areas involved, and the density of population. The provinces shared the grants with the municipalities (a 40/60 split was suggested) and the municipalities were expected to match the federal grant, although few did. Usually the amount available was greater than the claims submitted. This arrangement worked so well that it was continued until the end of the fiscal year 1944-5 when most ARP organizations were disbanded.
Another problem clarified under Manion’s direction was the nature and extent of equipment the federal government was to provide to ARP units. A complex policy for issuing equipment was worked out early in 1942. This established a basis for assessing requirements using the number of ARP workers in each area and degree of defence risk associated with local activity. A list of equipment was established for particular types of jobs and activities (such as fire-fighting and first aid), then equipment was distributed according to a priority system of designated risk. In 1942-3, additional orders were placed for sirens, first-aid, anti-gas, and fire fighting equipment and by the end of that fiscal year, $5 million worth of equipment had been provided to the six organized provinces and large quantities had been stockpiled.
Although gas was never actually used as a weapon in the Second World War, the possibility of gas attacks was taken very seriously. In April 1942, it was decided to equip all ARP workers with special respirators and to distribute gas masks to the whole civilian population in areas of definite risk. An order for two million civilian respirators, which included special types for children, babies, and helpless hospital patients, was placed with the Dominion Rubber Company. By December 1942, these masks were in the hands of the provinces but, despite some limited attempts to distribute them, most remained in storage unassembled. At the end of the war they were turned over to the War Assets Corporation.
Throughout 1942, gas advisers or officers were appointed to plan the ARP defence program for federal and provincial organizations and committees in larger centres. Gas instructors were trained at McGill University, and in February 1943, gas training began in many centres across Canada. Local decontamination squads were instructed, and gas cleansing centres were set up. When the possibility of enemy gas attacks became remote at the end of 1943, Brigadier General Alexander Ross cancelled further orders for anti-gas equipment and clothing. Ross had become Director of ARP after Manion’s death on 2 July of that year.
The war with Japan revived the possibility that it would be necessary to evacuate the civilian population from vulnerable areas. The Departmental Committee had considered this eventuality before the war, but only New Brunswick had prepared an evacuation plan to transport the non-essential population of Saint John to the interior of the province. In 1942, the federal government realized that areas on both the east and west coasts might have to be evacuated and an evacuation officer for each coast was appointed to the staff of the Director of ARP. Danger to Vancouver Island if the Japanese dropped incendiaries in its forests was the primary concern. British Columbia began developing evacuation plans for the island, but before reception arrangements on the mainland were complete the possibility of attack had become remote. In 1943, the federal evacuation officers were transferred to other duties.
During his time as Director of Civil Air Raid Precautions, Manion had continually asserted the importance of ARP as an aspect of national defence in his dealings with the Department of National Defence. Although ARP officials reported good co-operation with the military establishment in such local matters as developing an efficient air raid warning communications system, Manion felt that liaison between his office and National Defence officials in Ottawa was inadequate. He insisted that one officer from each service attend his staff conferences despite the reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff. After Manion’s death, however, Brigadier General Ross cancelled the new appointment of a full-time staff officer to the ARP staff. Ross had no compunction about approaching the Chiefs of Staff directly. Just after his appointment, a second area of tension between ARP and the military flared. This was the continuing loss of key ARP personnel to the armed forces, especially to the Reserve Army in British Columbia. In 1943 the Minister of National Defence issued instructions not to recruit key ARP members without the permission of the provincial committee.
Brigadier General Ross was just as aggressive as his predecessor in asserting ARP’s importance. In 1943, he recommended to the federal government that the name of his office be changed to Director of Civil Defence and that the ARP organization be known as Civil Defence. Such a change was in line with the nomenclature in the United States and Great Britain and, with provincial agreement, made for uniformity of name throughout the country. This change also suggests that, in the minds of some officials at least, Civil Defence had become an integral part of National Defence strategy. ARP had progressed from performing a peripheral role in air raid protection to claiming an important function in the defence of Canada.
While Manion and Ross were overhauling the central organization, the tempo of activity in the provinces was picking up. Local ARP organizations in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick began very actively training and recruiting in 1942 and 1943. In November 1941, Prince Edward Island was declared a vulnerable area and organized shortly thereafter, but Islanders never took ARP very seriously. Lighting restrictions were imposed in all three provinces in January 1942, although they were progressively relaxed until they were removed in 1944. Even though they were never called on to respond to an air raid, the ARP organizations demonstrated their usefulness in dealing with civil emergencies. In New Brunswick, workers contained several forest fires. In Nova Scotia (where the provincial organization was deliberately renamed the Provincial Civilian Emergency Committee), it responded to explosions at the Naval Arsenal in Dartmouth in 1944 and again in 1945. Once it became clear that the war was coming to an end, these organizations were disbanded. Removal of the siren system from Halifax in October 1945 marked the end of wartime Civil Defence in the Maritimes.
Civil defence in Quebec followed a variation on the same pattern. Much of the province had been organized before parts of it were declared to be vulnerable areas. By March 1943, Quebec’s organization had reached its peak with 145 ARP units staffed by 37,600 registered workers. While the number of units had decreased to 139 by March 1944, the number of workers had increased to 53,860. It is difficult to estimate the efficiency of the organization in Quebec, but the province was ready for a complete blackout by February 1942. A dimout was ordered until the end of navigation from Rivière du Loup to Gaspé because of submarine activity in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in September 1942.
This was reimposed the following spring and extended to cover a greater area along the north shore from the Saguenay River to the Labrador border. The dimout was enforced through the co-operation of ARP units, the Aircraft Detection Corps, the Reserve Army, and the RCMP. It represents Quebec’s major ARP accomplishment.
The Ontario Civilian Defence Committee developed the most elaborate organization in Canada by March 1943 with 71,587 registered workers in 123 ARP units in 15 areas. The chairman and vice-chairman both applied themselves with great energy to their tasks and forced the federal government to clarify the legal and financial arrangements of ARP. The Fire Marshal of Ontario was also Manion’s advisor on fire-fighting equipment and methods, and his Fire Services Manual was adopted Canada-wide. The Chiefs of Staff excluded Ontario from the risk of attack in November 1943, however, and most of the Ontario ARP organization was subsequently disbanded. Committees in the border communities of Sault Ste. Marie, Sarnia, Windsor, and Niagara Falls continued to function because their warning facilities were combined with those of the neighbouring American cities. Thus, 22 ARP units (14,180 registered workers) maintained their organization until the end of 1944, reporting directly to the federal office.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, ARP preparations intensified in British Columbia. The Premier of British Columbia reorganized the provincial ARP committee to deal with the increased demands and to control the politic-ridden ARP organizations in Vancouver and Victoria. He created a Civilian Protection Committee of four officials along with an Advisory Council whose main purpose was to eliminate the bickering between the different associations and groups involved in ARP. By March 1943, 139 units had been formed with 62,845 registered workers. A warning system of sirens was installed at the end of 1942 and the province held wide-spread blackout exercises. An evacuation scheme was also developed before federal evacuation officers were removed in October 1943. With the disbanding of ARP units in Ontario at the end of 1943, more fire fighting and anti-gas equipment was sent to the west coast. Japanese balloon bombs were dropped on B.C. in February 1945, prolonging the life of the Civilian Protection Committee in British Columbia until August.
The federal government began to wind down the Civil Defence organization once the risk of air raids diminished. As the Allies began to win the war, Ontario’s ARP organization was the first to be disbanded in November 1943. The central ARP office was the next to be weakened when the federal government decided that a full time Director of Civil Defence was no longer needed in August 1944. Brigadier General Ross, however, agreed to stay on without pay.
Temporary success of the German Ardennes offensive in December 1944 delayed further destruction for a time. In 1945, the provinces were advised to disband their organizations whenever they wished, and they were notified that all federal aid would cease with the end of the fiscal year on 31 March 1945. Because of their special circumstances, only the British Columbia and Halifax groups continued to function beyond that date.
Provincial committees were instructed to liquidate their financial obligations, account for all equipment issued to them, and turn it over to the War Assets Corporation. Personal equipment could be retained by workers, all of whom received a certificate signed by the Prime Minister and the Director of Civil Defence acknowledging their service to the country. Finally on 14 September 1945, the relevant Defence of Canada Regulations (except for parts of Regulation 35) were rescinded thus removing most of the restrictive measures for civil defence purposes.
During the war, about 775 communities were organized and received some equipment for ARP purposes. At its peak, about 280,000 workers were enrolled, most of whom were unpaid volunteers. In many smaller communities, the wartime ARP organizations, especially auxiliary fire services, did not disband but served on after the war. The governments of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia purchased all fire fighting equipment provided by the federal government with the result that more than 500 small communities, previously without organized fire protection, obtained organized, trained, and equipped fire brigades.
V Conclusion
Conceived by a government plagued by financial problems and the fear of national disunity, ARP could do little other than plan in secrecy before the Second World War. Once war came, the federal organization scrambled to bring vulnerable provinces onside, offering them organizational advice, limited financing, promises of equipment, and some training. It was not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 that ARP organizations began to coalesce. Under the energetic leadership of R. J. Manion and his successor Brigadier General Alexander Ross, financial problems with the provinces were solved and sufficient supplies and adequate training provided. By late 1943, danger had clearly passed and the ARP organizations were slowly disbanded. Even though ARP was never tested during the Second World War, it cast a long shadow over civil defence organizations in Canada in the Cold War era. The ARP philosophy that civil defence should be a voluntary local responsibility guided and supported by a central organization was to persist for years to come.
